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david lindsay 
The Wizard of Oz was a ruler who secreted himself in his castle and 
governed the Emerald City by deception and illusion. It was difficult 
enough just to get an audience with him, and the conditions attendant 
to petitioning the government (him) to redress one's grievances were 
just plain scary. 
This alone would probably be enough to make many of us demand 
his impeachment, especially in these days when exposés of the facades of 
some of our rulers and political institutions are becoming so frequent. 
It seems that a basic guideline for "good government'' today is T R U T H , 
in capital letters. 
But in Oz, wisdom is taken very seriously, more seriously than truth: 
Glinda, Ozma and the Wizard all embody wisdom. Somehow, in our 
struggle for enlightenment and for bettering the human condition, truth 
has become idolized as the ace of trumps. Wisdom appears to be in 
danger of getting lost in the shuffle. It is not at all unlikely that this may 
lead to truth being treated as an end in itself, instead of a means to 
an end. 
"How can I help being a humbug," said the Wizard, "when all these 
people make me do things everybody knows can't be done?" He ruled by 
deceit. Should he have been exposed by truth for what he really was: 
a frightened, timid little mortal, vigorously pulling levers to keep the 
illusion going? 
No. Lying in itself isn't evil or wrong. It's the motive behind the 
lie—and the truth—which may be evil or virtuous. Dorothy knew this, 
knew that truth is properly a means to an end, not an end in itself or 
an idol. Although she penetrated the facade of the Wizard, she kept the 
truth to herself, for the benefit of the Lion, the Tin Woodsman and 
the Scarecrow. 
"He [the Wizard] was a good man," said Dorothy, "even if he was a 
bad wizard." The Wizard wanted to give courage to the Lion, a heart to 
the Tin Woodsman and brains to the Scarecrow. He saw how vital these 
attributes were, but he also saw that he had a big problem in achieving 
his objectives. Yet he succeeded in giving all of them what they wanted 
and needed because they believed in him. He lied to them and the lie 
came true, because he was a wise man whose commitment to truth was 
subordinate to his commitment to the welfare of others. 
But perhaps the Wizard was only a shrewd, common politician who 
relied on illusion to give people merely the symbols of what they wanted, 
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a point trenchantly made by Henry Littlefield in his provocative article 
"The Wizard of Oz: Parable on Populism." The desires of the Scare-
crow, the Tin Woodsman and the Lion, he argues, were not only self-
deluding, but also self-induced. The Wizard of Oz to him is a Populist 
allegory, and he states that "throughout the story Baum poses a central 
thought; the American desire for symbols of fulfillment is illusory. Real 
needs lie elsewhere."1 
I wonder if that statement is completely accurate. Is it possible that 
the desire for symbols of fulfillment is real, and that fulfillment of at 
least some real needs might actually come about through the manipu-
lation of symbols, by the creation and perpetuation of certain illusions? 
I have concluded that most of us who teach for a living are bigots: 
we are strongly prejudiced in favor of learning and spreading truth, and 
we perpetuate this prejudice in our students. We're prejudiced because 
we have not examined the case for deceit in either our personal or our 
social lives. I would like to suggest ways to begin such an examination 
here. 
Much has been written about truth: the desirability of finding it, how 
to find it, where to find it. Little, however, has been written about 
whether or how to use it discreetly. People who do this are usually 
denounced as self-appointed censors who are bad, or self-seeking oppor-
tunists. Nearly all of the students in my political philosophy classes 
regularly denounce Plato for his Noble Lie. "He's trying to keep the 
truth from the people! Down with him!" 
But Plato wasn't concerned with truth as an end in itself. He was 
mainly concerned with creating a city where the good, the fulfilled and 
the virtuous could be one and the same person, whether he be guardian 
or mechanic. The highest principle behind legislation for the city was 
Virtue, the excellence of the human soul. Plato was well aware of human 
weaknesses, the constant temptations lurking within and around us 
which militate against virtue, fulfillment and the good life. He saw the 
need for the Noble Lie, the myth of the metals, to further virtue and the 
good society: the greatest amount of caring for the city and for one 
another simply would not come about unless everyone was taught to 
believe that people are all brothers and sisters and should love one 
another. 
In Book Seven of The Republic, Plato (speaking through Socrates) 
tells Adeimantus that "a convenient fiction," a "single bold flight of 
invention," is needed in order to keep the people in the community bound 
together in sympathy for one another. This was to be induced by 
bringing them to believe that all people were (allegorically) made of 
metal: gold, silver, iron, brass. Gold and silver people should rule; iron 
and brass should obey. If a child of gold is born into a family of brass, he 
should be given an opportunity to join the guardians, the rulers. Like-
wise, a child of iron born of golden parents should become a mechanic 
or farmer. 
Now Karl Popper views this noble lie as akin to the propaganda of 
the Nazis, created to justify rule by a master race. But John Hallowell 
views it as teaching just the opposite: (a) All people share a common 
humanity; we're all brothers and sisters, (b) People are unequal in 
natural endowments and potential for achievement, (c) There should be 
equality of opportunity in society; merit alone should determine one's 
place. 
Probably few of us would disagree with these concepts as Hallowell 
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interprets them. Furthermore, it would be "good" for us to believe in 
them. The problem arises in bringing people to believe in them in the 
first place. Hence, the need for the Noble Lie. 
Beliefs, myths and illusions that contribute to the cohesion of the 
city and the fulfillment and progress of the individual are worthwhile. 
These values of personal fulfillment, virtue and social cohesion transcend 
truth, and if we are concerned with promoting these values, our com-
mitment to truth must necessarily be conditioned accordingly. Truth, 
then, is not an absolute value, intrinsically precious. The teacher or 
philosopher who holds truth as intrinsically valuable and works for its 
widest possible distribution in society must also realize that he may be 
limiting or abandoning a responsibility for society's welfare, because 
truth can damage and subvert, as well as elevate, individuals and societies. 
I believe that most of us are at least vaguely aware that it is desirable 
(wise? virtuous? loving?) to make distinctions between individuals to 
whom we can and cannot tell certain truths, and the time when they 
should be told. Some "can take it" and are better for it; others may be 
seriously harmed, for truth can sometimes corrode self-confidence and 
mental health. It has been said that truth ought to be kept in a bottle 
marked "caution" and used only when necessary. 
Shakespeare was well aware of the creative role of deceit: 
When my love swears that she is made of truth, 
I do believe her, though I know she lies, 
That she might think me some untutored youth, 
Unlearned in the world's false subtleties. 
Thus vainly thinking that she thinks me young, 
Although she knows my days are past the best, 
Simply I credit her false-speaking tongue: 
On both sides thus is simple truth suppressed. 
But wherefore says she not she is unjust? 
And wherefore say not I that I am old? 
Oh, love's best habit is in seeming trust, 
And age in love loves not to have years told. 
Therefore I lie with her and she with me, 
And in our faults by lies we flattered be. (Sonnet 138) 
I can't think of anyone who doesn't rely, if only unconsciously, on at 
least some illusions—myths, if you prefer—to help keep himself or his 
family functioning in an effort to live the good life. We foist illusions or 
myths on others for the same reason, although of course it's also clone for 
reprehensible purposes. 
Illusions or myths can hold a person together, help make or keep him 
healthy. They can hold a family together healthily, and they can also 
help hold a nation together. Myths are a major ingredient of the social 
cement that helps keep people working together peacefully, creatively, and 
virtuously. To the extent that a myth serves a worthwhile purpose, I 
believe that anyone who urges promiscuous truth-telling without regard 
for personal or social consequences is doing himself, those he loves, and 
society as a whole (as well as future generations) a serious disservice. 
Is honesty really the best policy always? Is it true that crime doesn't 
pay? No. Evidence to the contrary abounds. But if we all weren't 
encouraged during our formative years to believe these myths, we'd surely 
be preying on each other even more than we do now. And if we teach 
our students that these are lies, we're helping to undermine a strong 
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force for honesty and law abidance in our society. I don't know if all 
people do share a common humanity, but I do hope the myth continues 
to be spread that we do. 
We sometimes deliberately lie to our students who come in for coun-
seling because they're doing poor work or their self-image is distressingly 
low. Lying to them may help them achieve, and that's part of our job. 
Believing, as the Wizard knew, can make it so! Convince a student that 
he can achieve, and he sometimes will achieve; the lie becomes a truth 
simply because it is believed. 
This was demonstrated by Rosenthal and Jacobson in their contro-
versial book Pygmalion in the Classroom. In their words, "the central 
proposition of this book is that one person's prophesy of another's in-
tellectual performance can come to determine that other's intellectual 
performance."2 
In this same vein, Galen the physician said in the second century A.D.: 
"He cures most in whom most are confident." There is abundant truth in 
this. Consider the effectiveness of placebos in medical treatment. Fred-
erick Evans, in his review of placebo studies, found that in a typical 
clinical situation three patients out of twelve will gain no relief from any 
medication, whether morphine or a placebo. Five of the twelve patients 
will greatly benefit from morphine but placebos won't help them much. 
The remaining four, or one-third of the patients, will have their pain 
reduced equally well by both morphine and a placebo. "The sensitive 
physician who is skillfully practicing the art of medicine will maximize 
the placebo effect, and thus help his patient at a minimum possible risk. 
Drugs such as morphine may be addicting. Sugar pills are not."3 Robert 
Coles reports that 
In 1961, Henry K. Beecher, professor of anesthesiology at 
the Harvard Medical School, published in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association an article called "Surgery as 
Placebo." He described a new operation to relieve angina 
pectoris, and reported that the benefits of it were the result 
"of what happened in the minds of the patients and the 
surgeons involved." Experiments revealed that surgeons 
who believed enthusiastically in the new method brought 
relief to patients four times as often as the skeptical surgeons 
did. It even turned out that a feigned operation, done 
under anesthesia and believed by the patient to be a com-
plicated surgery, was equally effective.4 
In contrast is fanatical devotion to truth of the sort exemplified in 
Kant's declaration that it is one's duty to answer truthfully the question 
of "a caller bent on murder" who asks whether the victim he seeks is at 
home, if one cannot evade answering. "It is a sacred command of reason, 
unlimited by any considerations of convenience, which bids us uncondi-
tionally to be truthful in all our declarations."5 Thus abstractions can 
become idolized with no regard for social consequences. Had the Wizard 
followed such procedures, he never would have been able to fulfill the 
needs of the Lion, the Tin Woodsman or the Scarecrow. Pascal com-
mented on this more than three hundred years ago: "We make an idol 
of truth; for truth without charity is not God, but His image and idol, 
which we must neither love nor worship." 
Machiavelli, another advocate of deceit when necessary, saw that it 
was of primary importance for the ruler to do the best he could with what-
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ever materials he had to work with. In sixteenth-century Italy, the 
materials were arbitrary and capricious princes, greedy nobles, and a 
populace which inclined toward sloth and indifference. Throughout his-
tory politicians have resorted to his advice whenever they considered it 
expedient to do so. When criticized for their actions, the politicians 
simply use Machiavelli's own defense: the particular breach of morality 
is in the public interest and thus justifiable. 
"Situation ethics" of this type isn't a new concept; theologians of the 
Middle Ages called it "conscience and casuistry": general principles of 
conduct must be considered in light of specific situations and circum-
stances. Sometimes it's necessary to violate one ethical value in order to 
achieve another of superior importance. The politician, whether he be a 
Renaissance prince or the Wizard of Oz, must be very aware of the prob-
lems involved in applying general principles to specific cases, since the 
welfare of the people is dependent on his decision. An equal caution 
applies to individuals: 
During World War II, a protestant pastor living in 
France rescued many Jews from the Nazis, secluding them 
in his attic. To prevent the police from being too curious, 
he drilled his children in deliberate lying: in response to 
questions from the police, they were to say that their father 
had no visitors. Their innocence, plus their ability to lie 
effectively in response to their father's training, possibly 
saved many a Jewish life. In one sense, the father, who 
preached the virtue of truth-telling in his sermons, was 
being Machiavellian. But he justified his actions on the 
ground that so far as he could see there was a conflict be-
tween the command to tell the truth and the command not 
to kill: had his children told the truth, they might have 
been guilty of cooperating in the execution of Jews.6 
Today, among college instructors of political science the most popular 
definition of politics is that it is the pursuit and exercise of power. 
Confucius, however, defined politics as "that which sets things right." 
The Wizard of Oz combined these concepts, fortunately for the Lion, the 
Tin Woodsman, and the Scarecrow. 
To appreciate the importance of illusion in understanding one part 
of our political system, we can begin briefly with Edmund Burke's concern 
with social cohesion and the threats to it from abstract reason and the 
political metaphysics of his time. To him, prejudice and tradition were 
more accurate guides to explaining civil society and guiding its policies, 
and religion was an essential ingredient of an orderly society. Mulford 
Sibley cites Burke's concern with the potential conflict between peace 
and truth: 
He placed so high a value on the former—and by the 
term he apparently meant the absence not only of physical 
conflict but also even of serious verbal clashes—that he 
made the primary test of whether truth should be spread 
abroad the likelihood or unlikelihood that it might ruffle the 
peace. Truth was uncertain at best, whereas the existence of 
a stable peace was a fact that could not be doubted.7 
A stable political system is not something to be taken lightly, espe-
cially in times of rapid change. As one observer put it, the big trick of 
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successful government is somehow to get the rulers and the ruled on the 
same side. This may involve subordinating truth to other values, such 
as progress, with a minimum of social disruption or violence. A brief 
analysis of judicial decision-making can help illustrate this point. 
One of the most unusual features of our political system is judicial 
review; it is rarely found in other political systems. Even here it has been 
controversial ever since Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous 
U.S. Supreme Court in 1803, assumed this power for the judicial branch 
of the national government. Nowhere in the U.S. Constitution is it ex-
pressly delegated to the court. No state constitutions expressly grant the 
power of judicial review to state supreme courts, yet all have come to 
exercise it. 
For generations, American students have had drummed into them 
the idea that ours is a political system of separation of powers together 
with checks and balances. The separation of powers aspect is the more 
heavily emphasized; certainly separation of powers is a reality in our 
political system. The actual law-making activities of the courts, however, 
are rarely elaborated on below the college level in our educational system 
or in the popular media. It is one of our myths that courts "interpret" or 
"discover" the law, not make it, and that the U.S. Supreme Court in 
particular is "above politics." Arthur North calls this a "friendly con-
spiracy," begun in the last century by people of good intention—lawyers, 
judges, professors and social scientists—who deeply revered and respected 
the Supreme Court.8 They wanted to keep the reputation of the Court 
above the disreputable politicking of the nineteenth century, and there-
fore they refused to admit that the Court was deeply involved in politics, 
the pursuit and exercise of power. Both conservatives and liberals have 
perpetuated this myth through the generations. 
Apparently one reason for spreading this misleading conception of 
the actual functioning of the Court is a widely held belief, perhaps often 
subconscious, that people will more readily accept the Court's more 
controversial lawmaking if it's called adjudication. Another possible 
reason could be that judicial review seems so obviously undemocratic. 
Why should "nine old men" have such power, especially since—according 
to one of the two basic views which have emerged in arguments about 
judicial review—judicial review has resulted in drastically changing the 
Constitution? 
The other view holds that the Supreme Court through its power of 
judicial review has played a significant role in holding the nation together. 
Proponents maintain that instead of wrecking the Constitution, judicial 
review has helped to enable it to survive and evolve with the times, to 
meet the everchanging needs and demands involved in promoting both a 
stable and progressive political system. The Court—as well as the Presi-
dent who nominates its members and the Senate, which votes on its 
nominees—does consider decisions in the light of current social trends. 
All judges, for example, will agree that the rule of precedent should 
be observed in judicial decisionmaking, yet they disagree on which prece-
dent is controlling in a given case. Prior to Baker v. Carr in 1962,9 for 
example, a majority of the Supreme Court had held repeatedly that 
matters of legislative apportionment were not justiciable issues, that it 
would be disastrous for the Court to enter this "political thicket." In the 
Baker case, the court reversed itself; a majority held that the Baker case 
was to be decided on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and since equal protection issues have always been justic-
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iable, the Court could and should intervene. Both sides agreed that 
precedent should be adhered to, but they disagreed on which precedent. 
Change resulted, but precedent seemed to be adhered to. The Court 
made the change because Congress and the state legislatures would not 
make it. 
It is extremely difficult to avoid concluding that judges make the law 
and apply their own values, and are influenced by the political, economic, 
and social environment in which they act. If the law—in the opinion 
of the Court—needs to be changed, and the legislative branch either 
won't or can't do the job, courts also sometimes resort to legal fictions or 
to "judicial activism." A writer in the Harvard Law Review defined a 
legal fiction as "a device for attaining desired legal consequences or 
avoiding undesired legal consequences."10 What is euphemistically called 
"judicial activism" is simply judicial invasion of the legislative or execu-
tive branch. Its goal is the promotion of what the judiciary considers 
desirable social ends by assuming decision-making power in certain areas 
previously considered the domain of the executive or legislative branch. 
The use of judicial review, judicial activism and legal fictions enable 
judges to get things done which they feel should not be postponed any 
longer. 
All this, of course, doesn't negate the concept of separation of powers, 
since judges can always be impeached and their appointment or election 
to the court involves several political steps. But it does constitute a sig-
nificant breach in the separation of powers doctrine, and this breach is 
often soft-pedaled by those who fear that it might result in undesirable 
political response from a hitherto relatively placid populace. 
An interesting example of the use of a legal fiction occurs in Mark 
Twain's humorous and profound account of the jailbreak of Jim, in 
The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Tom and Huck are trying to 
figure out the best way to free Jim from the shack in which he is 
imprisoned. Huck, the more practical of the two, simply wants to get 
Jim out by the most expedient, practical method: picks and shovels. 
Tom, after futilely explaining to Huck that breaking a person out of 
prison had to be done in a certain time-honored way, says that using 
case-knives is the only proper way to free Jim: "It don't make no differ-
ence how foolish it is, it's the right way. And there ain't no other way, 
that ever / heard of, and I've read all the books that gives any information 
about these things. They always dig out with a case-knife." 
Huck, still unconvinced, eventually gives in and that night joins Tom 
in digging, using nothing but case knives. So they dig and dig with case-
knives until midnight, but they don't get any closer to freeing Jim. 
Tom, exhausted, remarks, 
"It ain't no use, Huck, it ain't a-going to work. If we 
were prisoners . . . , we could keep it up right along, year in 
and year out, and do it right, and the way it ought to be 
one. But zve can't fool along; we got to rush; we ain't got 
no time to spare." 
"Well, then," says Huck, "what are we going to do, 
Tom?" 
"I'll tell you. It ain't right, and it ain't moral, and I 
wouldn't like it to get out; but there ain't only just the one 
way: we got to dig him out with the picks, and let on it's 
case knives." 
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"Now you're talking!" I says; "your head gets leveler 
and leveler all the time, Tom Sawyer," I says. "Picks is the 
thing, moral or no moral; and as for me, I don't care shucks 
for the morality of it, nohow. When I start in to steal a 
nigger, or a watermelon, or a Sunday-school book, I ain't 
no ways particular how it's done so it's done. What I want is 
my nigger; or what I want is my watermelon; or what I want 
is my Sunday-school book; and if a pick's the handiest 
thing, that's the thing I'm a-going to dig that nigger or that 
watermelon or that Sunday-school book out with; and I 
don't give a dead rat what the authorities thinks about it 
nuther." 
"Well," he says, "there's excuse for picks and letting on 
in a case like this; if it warn't so, I wouldn't approve of it, 
nor I wouldn't stand by and see the rules broke—because 
right is right and wrong is wrong, and a body ain't got no 
business doing wrong when he ain't ignorant and knows 
better. It might be the answer for you to dig Jim out with a 
pick, without any letting on, because you don't know no 
better but it wouldn't do for me, because I know better. 
Gimme a case-knife." 
He had his own by him, but I handed him mine. He 
flung it down and says: 
"Gimme a case-knife." 
I didn't know just what to do—but then I thought. 
I scratched around amongst the old tools, and got a 
pickax and gave it to him, and he took it and went to 
work, and never said a word. 
He was always just that particular. Full of principle. 
So they finally dig Jim out the wrong way, but the only practicable 
way under the circumstances. Still, custom and precedent were followed, 
as in some judicial decisions where the judges feel it necessary to call a 
pickax a case-knife. 
Most state constitutions or statutes forbid state legislatures to enact 
laws applying to a specific county. Yet the state courts have permitted 
their legislatures to classify counties for legislative purposes. California, 
for example, has fifty-eight counties, and the legislature has created fifty-
eight classes of counties in California. So when the California legislature 
enacts a law "applicable to all counties of the twelfth class," it of course 
applies to only one county. The state constitution of Missouri forbids 
more than four classifications of cities, yet the Governor's Advisory 
Commission on Local Law Reform in 1967 discovered over 167 additional 
classifications of municipalities based either on population or location.11 
But since judges (and legislators) can readily transform pickaxes into 
case-knives, precedent will ostensibly prevail. And if the spirit of the 
law is to survive, it may be necessary to break the letter of the law. 
If Plato correctly defined justice as the harmonious interaction of all 
a system's parts, then legal fictions dramatize the truth that judicial dis-
cretion—and deceit—can be vital for the pursuit of justice. Many dis-
agree, of course. Arthur North believes that this friendly conspiracy has 
outlived its usefulness and also that we should now accept the simple 
truth that the Court is actually engaged in the politics of governing the 
nation. 
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Stewart Alsop disagreed in a column he wrote in 1971 shortly before 
his death, when the U.S. Senate was considering William Rehnquist's 
appointment to the Court. After Alsop relates the origin and cultivation 
of the "useful myth," he states: 
The Warren Court, like the "nine old men" of Roose-
velt's day, was really making laws, in the name of judicial 
review and the Fourteenth Amendment. It was making 
laws, moreover, that would never have been passed by the 
legislative branch. So it was natural for conservative legis-
lators to be infuriated by the liberal Warren Court. And 
it is natural for liberal legislators to vote against Rehnquist 
because he is very much a conservative. 
There is only one rather illogical reason for not doing so. 
This is that to confirm or reject Supreme Court nominees 
on purely political and ideological grounds, without any 
valid cover-reasons, could destroy the myth. And the de-
struction of the myth could destroy the Court.12 
Courts in the United States possess neither the purse nor the sword, 
and the effectiveness of courts in general and the U.S. Supreme Court in 
particular depends on the faith we have in it. To Alsop, this faith is 
directly proportional to the belief that the court is above politics. If the 
myth is destroyed, so may be the court, and then we could have an 
extremely serious political and constitutional crisis. 
Those who wield power over others—doctors, teachers, politicians, 
parents or Wizards—must be aware of the role of illusion in the lives of 
people and in the peace and cohesion of a nation. Kant, however, recom-
mended that civilized people should not subordinate truth to anything, 
regardless of consequences. Unfortunately, the inhabitants of Oz didn't 
have the benefits of Kant's teachings on truth. As the Witch of the 
North said to Dorothy, "You see, the Land of Oz has never been civilized, 
for we are cut off from all the rest of the world." 
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